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Abstract
We report the results of a ﬁeld experiment with bicycle messengers in Switzerland
and the United States. Messenger work is individualized enough that ﬁrms can choose
to condition pay on it, but signiﬁcant externalities in messenger behavior nonetheless
give their on-the-job interactions the character of a social dilemma. Firms therefore
suﬀer eﬃciency losses when messengers fail to cooperate. Second-mover behavior in
our sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma allows us to characterize the cooperativeness of our
participants. We ﬁnd that messengers, like our student controls, have heterogeneous
social preferences, but are much more cooperative than students. Among messengers,
we ﬁnd that employees at ﬁrms that pay for performance are signiﬁcantly less coop-
erative than those who are paid hourly or are members of cooperatives. To examine
whether the diﬀerence is the result of treatment or selection we exploit the fact that
ﬁrm type is location-speciﬁc in Switzerland and that entering messengers must work
in performance pay ﬁrms in the U.S. We ﬁnd that the erosion of cooperation under
performance pay is predominantly due to treatment, and that the treatment eﬀect is
relatively rapid, more akin to the diﬀerential cueing of a behavioral norm than the
gradual acquisition of a new preference.
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11 Introduction
Economists have understood that the organization of work aﬀects the monetary incentives
of the workforce for more than three decades (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) and for most
of that time the standard assumption has been that money maximization is a suﬃciently
good description of the goals of agents to be used as a stand-alone proxy for all signiﬁcant
economic motivations. However, recent laboratory experiments have caused economists to
rethink the link between monetary incentives and motivation. Not only is there substantial
evidence showing that subjects often discount material incentives and act according to social
norms or preferences like reciprocity (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002), they sometimes ignore
material incentives altogether and act based on intrinsic motivation (Falk and Fehr, 2002).
Teamwork in particular characterizes a work process in which the material incentives
faced by individual employees can be confounded not only because individual and group
monetary incentives draw individuals towards diﬀerent actions, but because social preferences
can interact with material ones in unexpected ways. Social preferences are preferences over
monetary outcomes informed not only by the desire for one’s own well-being, but also aﬀected
by the beliefs, intentions, and well-being of others. They can reinforce material incentives,
but they can also render them ineﬀective, or even make material rewards counterproductive.
Furthermore, there is potential for dynamic eﬀects if preferences, whether material or social,
are endogenous with respect to the organization of work (Bowles, 1998).
A standard recommendation of labor economists in response to the team production prob-
lem is that employers should pay for individual performance, when individual performance
is suﬃciently measurable, to better align the incentives of individual employees with those of
the employer (e.g., Lazear, 2000). However, there are a number of possible problems with this
prescription. First, even when production is individualized enough that performance pay can
be used, the remaining teamwork features of the work process can cause interactions between
employees to have a social dilemma character. Second, such a prescription does not account
for the response of socially motivated employees to the implementation of performance pay.
Economists have sound predictions for the response of egoists to performance pay, but lab-
oratory evidence suggests that reciprocally, or otherwise socially-motivated agents, will not
respond the same way to performance pay (e.g., Fehr and Gaechter, 2002). On top of these
important issues, and the point of departure for the current study, performance pay itself
may partially determine worker social preferences in ways that, at a minimum, have so far
been un-modeled, and may be deleterious to production.
We provide empirical evidence addressing whether pay schemes aﬀect the distribution
of social preferences in a team production setting in which individual production is highly
measurable and some employers have chosen to implement performance pay. Speciﬁcally, we
measure the degree to which performance pay increases the number of egoistically categorized
bicycle messengers in a social dilemma experiment where the social framing is provided
by their workplace relationships. To connect our evidence with that in the conventional
experimental economics literature we also compare the behavior of our ﬁe l dp o p u l a t i o nt o
that of a student control group under the same protocol.
Bicycle messengers are especially suitable subjects for this project because their work,
delivering message parcels within a short time period, is essentially individualized production.
So even though there are many distinct sub-tasks involved in the production of one delivery,
2the resulting individual performance is measurable enough that ﬁrms can choose to condition
pay on it. But even the work of messengers paid by performance has a signiﬁcant teamwork
component, because some deliveries are better than others (i.e., pay at a higher rate, require
less eﬀort, or position the messenger more advantageously for later runs) and messengers
can take actions to inﬂuence the deliveries they are assigned. Mis-assigned deliveries (e.g.,
when the closest free messenger does not make the delivery) create externalities for other
messengers, and to the extent that such mis-assignments spatially or temporally misallocate
productive resources, potentially also aﬀect the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm.
Our research has uncovered three major ﬁndings. First, we ﬁnd that the compensation
scheme correlates with cooperative behavior. Messengers at ﬁrms that have adopted per-
formance pay are less cooperative both in our experiment - a sequential prisoner’s dilemma
game - and also according to survey measures of on-the-job and oﬀ-the-job behavior, as
compared to messengers at ﬁrms paying a hourly wage or a share of total revenues.
Second, and perhaps most strikingly, we ﬁnd that the social preferences of our couriers
are endogenous to the employer’s choice of compensation scheme. Among our subjects,
working under performance pay increases egoism. In fact, when we untangle the relative
impacts of self-selection by egoists into performance pay ﬁrms from the treatment eﬀect on
an arbitrary messenger of being in such a ﬁrm, the results suggest that the treatment eﬀect
is large, robust, and dominates self-selection.
Third, we ﬁnd that messengers are considerably more cooperative than students. Like
Carpenter et al. (2005), this suggests that the workplace frame matters. However, we also
note that an experiment by Kosfeld et al. (2003), shows that a small amount of pre-play
communication added to a nearly identical protocol is suﬃcient to make the level of coopera-
tion displayed by students similar to that of our messengers. Considering both experiments,
our results may provide some insight into how communication triggers behavioral norms in
economically important social settings.
2 The structure and incentives of the courier industry
Bicycle messengers deliver parcels as small as letters and as big as boxes that require the
rider to attach a trailer to his or her bike. Among the workers, such an assignment is known
as a “tag.” Many of the tags (among our subjects, on average 37%) involve ferrying legal
documents around the ﬁnancial centers of the cities in which we conducted the experiment.
However, the pay per tag and the eﬀort required to deliver a parcel is variable. In general,
the price charged to a sender depends on the number of “zones” the courier needs to cross
to make the delivery. But even for commission-paid couriers the relationship between eﬀort
and remuneration is not perfect. For instance, legal tags tend to pay more for the time
required, some buildings are easier to access for pickups or deliveries with a bicycle than
others, and, in cities like Zürich and San Francisco, messengers may encounter non-trivial
hills. In addition, on commission pay empty miles carry a zero pay rate, and some tags go
to destinations that impose a higher chance of a long empty run to the next pickup than do
others.
Most couriers work on commission. The average commission-paid messenger in our sam-
ple earns 45% of the revenue the tag generates for the ﬁrm (40% is a common norm). Among
3the non-commission riders are those who are paid an hourly wage (the average is $17.71/hour
among our subjects) and those who are members of coops that share revenues based on the
proportion of total work hours contributed. On average, the revenue sharing coops in our
sample pay out 2.4 times a month and share 59% of total revenue.
In addition to variation in pay schemes, there is some institutional variation in the way
that tags are allocated to couriers. Most couriers (94% among our subjects) receive assign-
ments directly from a central dispatcher over handheld radios or phones. This procedure
is known as allocated dispatch. Despite the primary control held by the dispatcher under
this system, messengers can signiﬁcantly aﬀect their assignments at most ﬁrms by how they
report their work progress and whether they respond to a particular call. The spatial dis-
tribution of pickup and delivery locations means that by reporting a tag done either early
or late the messenger can aﬀect the dispatcher’s information about whether their location is
optimal for taking on a particular new tag. Since it is usually not smart to try to respond
to radios and phones while riding in traﬃc, a messenger can choose to ignore some calls
without penalty.
Some ﬁrms have their radios set up so that each messenger can hear the assignments
made to some or all of the others, which provides information that individual messengers
can use either cooperatively or strategically. The remaining few couriers claim tags in the
free call system, wherein a central dispatcher broadcasts each tag to all of the riders and the
rider who responds ﬁrst makes the pickup.
Under both dispatch systems the individual material incentives at ﬁrms that pay com-
mission are those of a common pool resource problem, although the degree of the problem
is most severe under free call. Couriers can choose to directly “cherry pick” (freecall) the
best tags, or manipulate the dispatcher’s information to make getting good tags more likely
(allocated dispatch), regardless of whether or not they are the best suited from the ﬁrm’s
perspective to make the delivery. At ﬁrms that pay hourly wages or a share of total ﬁrm
revenues, the incentives are those of a public goods game. Couriers can choose to lay back
and avoid high eﬀort tags, free-riding (literally) on the eﬀorts of their co-workers. As a
result the degree of egoistic behavior of its messengers can aﬀect the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm
because uncooperative behavior can lead to the misallocation of messenger resources both
in time and over the geographic area served by the ﬁrm.
3O u r ﬁeld experiment
We used a strategic form of the sequential prisoner’s dilemma game (PD) to measure the
cooperative predispositions of the bicycle messengers who took part in our experiment. Each
messenger ﬁlled out a strategy sheet for their choice as a ﬁrst-mover, and then also for their
choices, conditioned on ﬁrst-mover actions, as a second-mover. They were informed that a
coin toss would decide which of their roles would be activated when we made ﬁnal payouts.
Playing the PD sequentially provides us with a well-deﬁned typography of player strate-
gies. In the simultaneous version of the PD one can not distinguish, for example, between
egoists who simply play the dominant strategy and conditional cooperators who defect, but
would have cooperated, provided their partner had done so. But by looking at the second-
mover strategy chosen in the sequential PD one can identity four possible “types”: Egoists
4who defect no matter what, Altruists who cooperate regardless of what the ﬁrst-mover has
done, Conditional Cooperators who cooperate only if the ﬁrst-mover cooperates, and what
we have termed Wingnuts who defect if the ﬁrst-mover cooperates, but cooperate if the
ﬁrst-mover defects. We interpreted “wingnuts” as participants that did not understand the
experiment. Only 3% of our messengers fell into this category, and we chose to exclude these
eight observations from our analysis.
In theory, using the sequential form of the PD means that any expectations second-
movers may have formed about the distribution of cooperative types in the population are
irrelevant when implementing a conditional strategy. Following Manski (2002) we chose to
elicit expectations about the cooperativeness of the pool of players from each of our partici-
pants. To give our participants the incentive to think about their estimates, they were paid
an additional amount of money for being close to the true distribution of choices. These
expectations data provide us with another dependent variable that might be explained by
diﬀerences in the employment contract. Not only might the distribution of social prefer-
ences be endogenous to the use of performance pay, these diﬀerences might correspond to
diﬀerences in what our messengers expect from each other. For example, if more egoism
occurs under piece rates, it would not be surprising if messengers were to show awareness of
this in their expectations of how other messengers in their ﬁrm will react to social dilemma
incentives.
We chose to maximize the amount of information we gathered from each of our partici-
pants by using the strategic form and asking participants to make choices in both ﬁrst- and
second-mover roles both because of the type identiﬁcation issues discussed above, and also
because the high eﬀo r ta n de x p e n s eo fﬁeld work with a small and widely dispersed subject
pool make every datum valuable. This raises the question of how comparable our results are
to those from simultaneous single-role experiments. To provide a link to the standard lab
literature we ran control sessions with University of Zürich students.
We deliberately put a mild frame on our instructions with messenger subjects because we
were interested in our participants’ cooperative predispositions at work, speciﬁcally. While
the exact wording of our instructions can be viewed in the appendix, the extent of the frame
was to label the two roles as “messenger A” and “messenger B”, and to refer to the choices
as “cooperate” and “not cooperate.” The balance of the instructions was neutrally worded.
Our goal in this approach was to let the subjects bring with them whatever frame was cued
by the fact that they are playing with fellow messengers, that the physical location was
associated with their work, and that the study was of messengers.
The details of our protocol are as follows. We conducted the experiment at relatively
high stakes: mutual cooperation yielded $30 each on top of $15 for ﬁlling out our survey.
The maximum a subject could earn was $64 from not cooperating with a cooperator and
accurately estimating the distribution of types in the population; the average payout was
$44 in San Francisco and 59CHF in Switzerland.1 We ﬁrst handed out surveys to as many
messengers as we could ﬁnd. In San Francisco we dropped surveys at messenger service
oﬃces, and then spent ten days hanging around at “the wall” in the ﬁnancial district, a
small public gathering area where the messengers congregate to eat lunch. In Switzerland,
we went directly to the breakrooms at the oﬃces of the messenger services, or to public areas
1All experiments were conducted during the period from May through September, 2003.
5immediately outside, to distribute surveys and collect participant decisions. When returning
the survey, the messengers were asked to stay for an additional 15 minutes to read and ﬁll
out the decision sheets for our experiment.
Because it was impossible to gather all our participants at once, we created a protocol that
allowed us to collect one observation at a time. Participants read approximately one page of
instructions (see the Appendix) and ﬁlled out six control questions. Once a participant had
answered the questions correctly (s)he was allowed to proceed. We ﬁrst asked participants
to give their expectations about how many of the other participants would cooperate if the
respondent cooperated as the ﬁrst-mover, and then repeated the question for the case in
which the respondent did not cooperate as the ﬁrst-mover. Participants then chose whether
to cooperate or not as the ﬁrst-mover.
The second task of each respondent was to submit a strategy as the second-mover. Par-
ticipants were ﬁrst asked to give their expectations about how many ﬁrst-movers would
cooperate. They then submitted a strategy: what they wanted to do if the ﬁrst-mover
cooperated, and what they wanted to do if the ﬁrst-mover did not cooperate.
As we explained to the participants, to generate ﬁnal payoﬀs all the responses we collected
were pooled and matched at random, with ﬁrst- versus second-mover roles assigned by the
ﬂip of a coin. Payoﬀs were determined by the intersection of the matched responses and the
degree to which the expectations of the subjects were correct. We asked the participants to
indicate whether they preferred to pick up their payoﬀs (in private) at a later pre-speciﬁed
date and place, or to have their payoﬀsm a i l e d .
4 Our participants
We gathered data from 252 messengers; 139 worked in Zürich, Basel, Bern, or Luzern and
the remaining 113 worked in San Francisco.2 Table 1 provides summary statistics from
our participant demographics. Our messengers were rather optimistic about how second-
movers would respond to a cooperative ﬁrst-mover. On average, they expected that 67% of
the other players would cooperate in the second-mover role if the ﬁrst-mover cooperated. In
fact, these expectations are not optimistic enough because 86% of the messengers cooperated
in the second-mover role.
Performance pay is by far the norm among our participants; 82% were paid on com-
mission. Even more common than performance pay is allocated dispatch. Only 6% of our
participants were dispatched by free call.3 The average tenure at the current messenger job
was a little more than three years. While 39% of messengers work full time (more than 34
hours a week), many others work only a few shifts a week (the average is 27.48 hours) and
the average annual earnings of a messenger are $22,411. As alluded to at the beginning of
this section, our sample is relatively well balanced by location; 55% of the respondents were
2In San Francisco, the anonymous counterparts of each subject in the experiment were drawn from a
group that matched the ﬁrm size of the subject, either messengers employed at small ﬁrms, at medium-sized
ﬁrms, or at large ﬁrms. In Switzerland, where all the ﬁrms were medium or large, and two were unique to
their home city, we grouped messengers within each ﬁrm.
3We think these percentages reﬂect the underlying population of messengers. That is, we did not get the
impression that we over-sampled commission couriers or under-sampled free call couriers.
6Swiss. Being a courier is a male-dominated occupation. In our sample 85% of the respon-
dents were men. In terms of other standard demographics, our average participant was 30
years old, high school educated, un-married, and a third were students.
5 A summary of behavior in the experiment
As an overview of our experimental results, Figure 1 illustrates histograms of the distribution
of second-mover types in our experiment by compensation scheme. In the left panel we pool
all the messengers who are not paid by commission. This sub-sample is split between 70%
who share revenues in diﬀerent cooperatives and 30% who are paid hourly. We pool the
revenue sharing messengers with the hourly paid messengers because they face the same
individual material incentive to shirk on the job. As one can see, the two histograms have
the same basic shape (the modal participant is a conditional cooperator) but it is also clear
that there are more egoists and fewer altruists in performance pay ﬁrms.
Because our typography of choices as second-movers results in a categorical or nominal
measure of messenger social preferences, to test whether the diﬀerence in the distribution
of types by ﬁrm type is signiﬁcant, we employ the Pearson χ2 test. This test determines
whether the diﬀerence in proportions exceed those expected by chance. In fact, it does not
appear that chance can explain the diﬀerences we see in Figure 1 (χ2 =5 .37,p =0 .02).
Performance pay ﬁrms are associated with more egoism and less altruism.
In Figure 2 we ﬁnd the corresponding diﬀerences in beliefs that suggest that multiple
equilibria will evolve in the distribution of social preferences according to how ﬁrms orga-
nize compensation. Not only are couriers less cooperative in performance pay ﬁrms, they
expect that their co-workers to be less cooperative. As an illustration of this, we focus on
second-mover beliefs which should be relatively unbiased compared to ﬁrst-mover beliefs
which might be inﬂuenced by the risk attitudes.4 While the cooperative and hourly workers
expect that 73% of the other messengers will cooperate if the ﬁrst-mover does, their coun-
terparts in performance pay ﬁrms think that only 65% will. This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant
(t =1 .74,p=0 .04) indicating the more optimistic expectations of messengers who do not
work on commission.
We also we asked our participants about their behavior at work and oﬀ the job. Many of
their responses correlate signiﬁcantly with whether or not they were categorized as an egoist
in the experiment. Among the signiﬁcant correlations were, responses to “I try my best to
h e l po u to t h e r sa tw o r k ”( rho = −0.13,p=0 .04); “If the weather is bad, I sometimes take
it easy” (rho =0 .12,p=0 .07); “I let messengers who work hard know I appreciate them”
(rho = −0.15,p=0 .02); “How often do you give to panhandlers?” (rho = −0.18,p<0.01);
“How often do you lend small amounts of money to friends” (rho = −0.11,p =0 .07).
Although these are self-reports, they do suggest that our experimental measure of egoism is
a valuable proxy for broader behavior on the job.
4That said, the results are nearly identical if we consider beliefs about the cooperativeness of ﬁrst-movers
instead.
76 Messengers versus students
Before we dig deeper into the diﬀerences in the behavior of our messengers, we would like to
assess the degree to which our pooled distribution of messenger types is similar to what one
would see in the traditional lab setting with student subjects. To link our ﬁeld implementa-
tion to the more standard experimental literature we ran a session with students enrolled at
the University of Zürich. The only diﬀerence between the lab and our ﬁeld implementation
w a st h a tw ee l i c i t e da l lt h es t u d e n tr e s p o n s e sa tt h es a m et i m e ,a n dt h ef r a m ew a s“ w i t h
other students” as opposed to “with other messengers.” The protocol was otherwise the same
across the two subject groups.
Figure 3 suggests that there are large diﬀerences in the distribution of behavior. There
appear to be many more egoists and many fewer altruists in the student population. This
diﬀerence in proportions is highly signiﬁcant (χ2 =3 0 .03,p<0.01). As within our messenger
population, the diﬀerences we ﬁnd in student behavior extend to their beliefs. In Figure 4
we see that the student distribution of beliefs about second-mover cooperation is the mirror
image of messenger beliefs and none of our students expected that all the other students
would cooperate if the ﬁrst-mover does. It comes as no surprise that these two means are
highly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (t =7 .87,p<0.01) and the pessimistic beliefs of the students
correspond closely to the amount of cooperation they actually experienced in the experiment.
While it is tempting to conclude that our student control experiment has little external
validity with respect to our messengers who face the sort of social dilemma modeled by
the experiment on the job, we actually prefer a diﬀerent interpretation of this diﬀerence,
one that is bolstered by the experiments reported on in Kosfeld et al. (2003). Kosfeld et
al. also conduct a sequential PD experiment with two treatments. In both treatments they
s a m p l ef r o mt h es a m ep o o lo fU n i v e r s i t yo fZ ü r i c hs t u d e n t st h a tw ed i d ,b u ti no n et r e a t m e n t
they allowed the participants to communicate face-to-face with each other before choosing
strategies. Our student distribution of types is identical to their baseline implementation
but, more importantly, our messenger distribution looks very similar to the distribution
they elicit in the communication treatment. This suggests that the diﬀerence between our
messenger and student distributions may have to do with how communication cues relevant
behavioral norms.
7 Is egoism endogenous to the compensation scheme?
Re-focusing on the messenger data alone, we see that the most noticeable diﬀerence between
the two histograms in Figure 1 is the proportion of egoists working under a particular set
of incentives. Although egoism is clearly not the mode in either distribution and egoistic
types account for only 4% (2 of 46) of the participants compensated by revenue sharing or
hourly pay, there are four times as many egoists (34 of 206) working on commission. A more
subtle diﬀerence also exists in the number of altruists. However, relative to the number of
conditional cooperators (our basis for comparison), the diﬀerences between performance pay
ﬁrms and the others are smaller. There are 76% as many altruists as conditional cooperators
in non-performance pay ﬁrms and 71% in performance pay ﬁrms. The obvious question is
what accounts for the fact that there are so many more egoists working on commission?
8Are social preferences endogenous with respect to compensation schemes (i.e., does work-
ing on commission make people more egoistic) or do egoists disproportionately select into
performance pay ﬁrms?
Two things allow us to identify a possible treatment eﬀect for a sub-sample of our messen-
gers. For the 139 messengers working in Switzerland, diﬀerential selection into performance
pay is not possible because the employment contract only varies across cities, it does not
vary within a city. Hence, all 68 messengers from Zürich and all 29 and 20 from Basel and
Luzern, respectively are paid on commission while the 22 working in Bern are members of
a cooperative. One might object that couriers could commute to diﬀerent cities to work
under the scheme of their choice, but these distances are non-trivial, and we know for a
fact that no one does this. Hence, if an individual is attracted to the bicycle messenger
subculture, and decides that (s)he wants to seek employment as a courier in Switzerland,
his location determines how he will be compensated. Therefore, the compensation scheme
is not endogenous for our Swiss messengers.
In San Francisco, the industry is structured so that new entrants must gain experience in
the relatively large performance pay ﬁrms before they can decide to join an hourly pay ﬁrm
or a coop. So if an individual is attracted to the bicycle messenger subculture, and decides
that (s)he wants to seek employment as a courier in San Francisco, (s)he will have to start her
career as a performance pay employee. This fact gives us another 18 observations for which
compensation is not a choice variable. These are workers who have less than 18 months of
experience in the industry.5 Altogether, 63% of our (non-wingnut) sample is comprised of
messengers whose behavior in our experiment could not be explained by diﬀerential selection
into one compensation scheme or another.
The tenacious critic, however, might still object. Even though there is no diﬀerential
selection of messengers into employment contract for this sub-sample, behavioral types may
still diﬀerentially select into a career as a messenger and if, for example altruists are more
likely to become messengers in Bern and egoists are more likely to become messengers in
Zürich, then there is still an issue. Our survey data does not suggest that this is a problem.
We asked the messengers to respond (on a 5-point Likert scale from -2 to 2) to the state-
ment, “Working as a bike messenger is more than just a job.” The mean response was 1.33
indicating that most people are very committed to being a bike messenger. Furthermore,
the responses to this question do not vary signiﬁcantly by location (χ2 =1 8 .93,p =0 .27)
or by compensation scheme (χ2 =2 .13,p=0 .71) which suggests that our participants be-
come messengers because of cultural or lifestyle reasons that have nothing to do with social
preference or performance pay.
To assess the magnitude of the treatment eﬀect of performance pay on social preferences,
we regress the behavioral type of a messenger on the compensation scheme the individual
works under. To be both comprehensive and as agnostic as possible about the diﬀerences
between types we use the multinomial logit estimator with conditional cooperators as the
comparison group and report robust standard errors to account for the possibility of het-
eroskedasticity.
5There are only two exceptions to this rule that make our identiﬁcation of the employment contract only
99% perfect. That is, there were two new entrants in San Francisco not actually working under performance
pay that had to be recoded as performance pay according to our identiﬁcation procedure.
9We build our empirical model gradually by adding controls in four steps. However, there
are eight estimates in Table 2 because for each step we compare the estimate using the full
sample to the estimate based on only our restricted sub-sample for whom selection is not an
issue. These comparisons allow the reader to assess the possible impact of selection at each
stage of our analysis. In column (1) we see that, with no controls or conditioning variables,
messengers in the full sample are 13% (p<0.01) more likely to be egoists (than conditional
cooperators) in performance pay ﬁrms. Performance pay messengers are also 4% less likely
to be altruists but this result is not signiﬁcant. The point estimate of the treatment eﬀect of
performance pay on egoism falls to 12% (p<0.05) when we shift attention to the restricted
sample in column (1r) but the diﬀerence is very small and not signiﬁcant.
As we add controls we see that our estimate of the treatment eﬀect of performance pay on
egoism is very robust. While the coeﬃcient hovers between 12 and 15 percent, the standard
errors suggest that these ﬂuctuations are not important (i.e., the estimates are within the
conﬁdence intervals of each other) and therefore that selection is not likely to bias our results
much. Equally important, the estimate is always statistically signiﬁcant.
In columns (2) and (2r) we ask whether the treatment of messengers happens gradually
or whether diﬀerences in the employment contract cue existing behavioral norms. Because
neither tenure on the current job nor the diﬀerential aﬀect of tenure in performance pay
ﬁrms are remotely signiﬁcant, it appears that social preferences in this case change quickly.6
In columns (3) and (3r) we add the eight demographic controls listed in Table 1. For
egoists, none of these factors are robust and most are never signiﬁcant. For altruists, however,
one demographic factor is robust. Older messengers are much more likely to be altruistic.
A standard deviation increase in age is associated with a 7% increase in the probability of
being an altruist in the full sample and a 16% increase in the restricted sub-sample. The
stylized fact, that older people appear more prosocial has been replicated in a number of
diﬀerent social dilemma ﬁeld settings (e.g., List, 2004 or Carpenter and Seki, 2006).
In sum, we ﬁnd little evidence of selection as an explanation for the diﬀerences in the
distribution of social preferences shown in Figure 1. Our estimates of the treatment eﬀect of
performance pay on egoism from the sub-sample for whom selection is not possible are very
similar to our estimates from the full sample. Performance pay appears to make messengers
between 12 and 15% more likely to behave egoistically towards their co-workers.
8 Endogenous beliefs
Beliefs also appear to depend on the ﬁrm’s choice of compensation scheme. As depicted in
Figure 2, performance pay workers are less optimistic, and correctly so, about how many
second-movers will cooperate. In this sense, our beliefs data, along with the fact that the
behavioral treatment appears to happen quickly, add credence to the idea that what we
observe here are two distinct behavioral equilibria along a spectrum of employment contracts.
As with behavior as a second-mover, we can use the restricted sample of messengers who
could not choose the type of ﬁrm they are working in to control for any belief-based selection.
6This is somewhat diﬀerent than Carpenter and Seki (2006) who ﬁnd that the social preferences of
Japanese ﬁshermen change more gradually in response to diﬀerences in the compensation scheme.
10We report our estimates in Table 3 which is organized similarly to Table 2. The only
diﬀerence is that we report Tobit regressions instead of multinomial logits. In our baseline,
columns (1) and (1r) indicate a signiﬁcant eﬀect of performance pay on messenger beliefs.
In the full sample (1) performance pay couriers believe that 9% fewer of their co-workers
will cooperate as a second-mover (p<0.05). Unlike our ﬁndings on the eﬀects of selection
on experimental behavior, the coeﬃcient from the restricted sub-sample of those who work
under a particular compensation scheme that is exogenously determined is roughly twice as
big. Those in the restricted subsample who were working under performance pay expected
20% fewer of their co-workers to cooperate (p<0.01).
Interestingly, the selection eﬀect we may observe is positive: it suggests that some people
who have optimistic views of the cooperative inclinations of their co-workers are more likely to
pick a performance pay ﬁrm, when they have a choice of ﬁrm type. This is not as surprising as
it ﬁrst appears, however, because among those with varying beliefs about the cooperativeness
of their potential coworkers, only the most optimistic will select into performance pay ﬁrms.
Those with pessimistic beliefs should be more likely to avoid a workplace that they perceive
to be populated by uncooperative employees. That said the evidence for selection on beliefs
is not terribly strong because the point estimate from the restricted sample tends to lie
within the conﬁdence interval of the full sample estimate.
9C o n c l u s i o n
We conducted a sequential strategic-form prisoner’s dilemma ﬁeld experiment with workers
(bicycle messengers), who work under social dilemma incentives and two diﬀerent compen-
sation schemes. Our goal was to see if social preferences are endogenous to whether the
compensation scheme involved performance pay. In addition, we ran a separate control ex-
periment with students to link our results to the laboratory literature on social preferences.
First, we ﬁnd that messengers do exhibit preference heterogeneity, and that they are con-
siderably more cooperative than students in our sequential prisoner’s dilemma experiment.
As in Carpenter et al. (2005), this suggests that the workplace frame matters. Second,
we ﬁnd that the compensation scheme correlates with cooperative behavior. Messengers at
ﬁrms that have adopted performance pay are less cooperative both in the game and also
according to survey measures of on-the-job and oﬀ-the-job behavior, as compared to mes-
sengers at ﬁr m sp a y i n ga nh o u r l yw a g eo ras h a r eo ft otal revenues. Third, and perhaps
most interestingly, we ﬁnd evidence that the preferences of messengers are endogenous to
the employer’s choice of compensation scheme. Working under performance pay appears to
increase egoism. In fact, our regression analysis suggests that this “treatment” eﬀe c ti sl a r g e ,
robust, and dominates any self-selection by egoists into performance pay ﬁrms. The eﬀect
is also immediate (within the limits of our survey-based measure of tenure length), which
suggests its character could be closer to cueing a behavior-guiding norm than to gradually
adopting a new preference.
What are the potential implications for human relations in the workplace and, ultimately,
for ﬁrm proﬁtability? Rotemberg (1994) demonstrated that altruism could evolve in the
workplace if there are strategic complementarities among workers, as is the case with our
messengers. Our ﬁeld experiment is consistent with this theoretical possibility, because the
11amount of prosocial behavior that we see is correlated with the pay scheme. We do not,
however, ﬁnd evidence of the sort of enlightened self-interest that is implied by Rotemberg’s
model (pp. 686). That is, we see no evidence that our messengers consciously change their
preferences.
A tt h i sp o i n tw ec a no n l ys p e c u l a t ea b o u tt h ei m p l i c a t i o n so fs o c i a lp r e f e r e n c e sf o rt h e
overall proﬁtability of ﬁrms, as we do not have on-the-job performance data for the subjects
of the current study. While the empirical evidence oﬀered in Lazear (2000) unambiguously
suggests that performance pay increases proﬁts when individual eﬀort is identiﬁable and
strategic complementarities among workers are weak, it is as yet unknown what happens
when complementarities are more important and social preferences are present. It could
be that performance pay “spoils” the pool of social preferences, so that when commission
pay is introduced, between-worker cooperation may fall compared to hourly pay ﬁrms or
revenue sharing cooperatives. This cost would reduce the net beneﬁt of using performance
pay. Indeed, if the complementarities in the production process are important enough, this
could raise the possibility that in some settings performance pay results in lower net proﬁts,
for social preference reasons.
1210 Appendix — Experimental instructions
You and another messenger will now participate in a decision-making problem. The other
messenger works at «ﬁrm» Neither you nor the other messenger will ever know each other’s
identity. Please read the instructions carefully. The choices you and the other messenger
will make determine how much cash you each will get in this decision-making problem. The
monetary stakes are high so you should consider your choice carefully. In this decision-
making problem, we refer to the two parties involved as “messenger A” and “messenger B”.
The choices that the two messengers can make are very similar:
• Messenger A has two options: Cooperate or Not Cooperate.
• Messenger B has the same two options, but chooses after messenger A. So, ﬁrst, if
messenger A cooperates, Messenger B indicates whether he or she will respond by cooperating
or not cooperating. Second, if messenger A doesn’t cooperate, messenger B indicates whether
he or she will respond by cooperating or not cooperating.
Your choices will lead to diﬀerent payoﬀs for you and for the messenger you are paired
with (on top of what you earned so far). The choices, and the payoﬀs they result in, are
summarized in the following table:
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13What will you do?
Each messenger will choose what to do in both the messenger A role and the messenger B
role, because you could end up in either role. We will also ask you to estimate what the
other messengers will do.
At a later date (see the address sheet), after we gather choices from a number of mes-
sengers at your ﬁrm, we will match you with another messenger and ﬂip a coin to determine
whether you will be messenger A or messenger B (the other messenger will assume the other
role).
Once you are matched, and assigned a role as an A or a B, the choices that were made
by you and the messenger you are matched with will determine how much each of you will
earn. We will pay you your earnings. Neither you nor the other messenger will ever know
each other’s identity.
Does everyone understand?
Before we proceed, please take a minute to answer the following three questions. Everyone
will be asked the same questions to ensure that all the participants understand the decision
exercise. Use the payoﬀ table on the ﬁrst page to answer these questions.
Question 1: Suppose messenger A decides to cooperate.
(i) How much would messenger B earn if he does not cooperate?
Messenger B would earn ______ dollars.
(ii) How much would messenger B earn if he cooperates?
Messenger B would earn ______ dollars.
Question 2: Suppose messenger A decides not to cooperate.
(i) How much would messenger B earn if he does not cooperate?
Messenger B would earn ______ dollars.
(ii) How much would messenger B earn if he cooperates?
Messenger B would earn ______ dollars.
Question 3: Suppose messenger A chooses to cooperate, and messenger B responds by co-
operating.
(i) How much does messenger A earn?
Messenger A earns ______ dollars.
(ii) How much does messenger B earn?
Messenger B earns ______ dollars.
Decision Sheet ONE (for your Messenger A choice).
If the coin ﬂip gives you the messenger A role, your choice from this decision sheet will be
used. To decide what you want to do consult the table of choices and earnings on ﬁrst page
of the instructions. You have two decisions to make.
First: indicate what you think the group of other messengers, one of which you will be
paired with, will do as messenger B. You will be paid an additional two dollars if your two
estimates are within plus or minus ﬁve percent of the actual percentage of what the other
messengers choose.
• If I cooperate as messenger A, _____ percent of the other messengers in my
group will choose cooperate as messenger B.
14• If I do not cooperate as messenger A, ______ percent of the other messengers
in my group will choose cooperate as messenger B.
Second: Your Decision as Messenger A: Please indicate whether you chose “cooperate”
or “not cooperate” if you are assigned to be messenger A.
My choice if I am messenger A
(please choose only one)
◦ Cooperate ◦ Not Cooperate
Please double-check your choices on this sheet.
Please notify the experimenters if you are done with this decision sheet.
You will then receive the second decision sheet.
Decision Sheet TWO (for your Messenger B choice).
If the coin ﬂip gives you the messenger B role, your choice from this decision sheet will be
used. To decide what you want to do consult the table of choices and earnings on ﬁrst page
of the instructions. You have two decisions to make.
First: indicate what you think the group of other messengers, once of which you will
be paired with, will do as messenger A. You will be paid an additional two dollars if your
estimate is within plus or minus ﬁve percent of the actual percentage of what the other
messengers choose.
• As messenger A, _____ percent of the other messengers in my group will choose
to cooperate.
Second: Your Decision as Messenger B: Please indicate what you will do if you are
assigned to be messenger B.
My choice if I am messenger B
If messenger A cooperates, I will If messenger A does not cooperate, I will
◦ Cooperate ◦ Not Cooperate ◦ Cooperate ◦ Not Cooperate
Please double-check your choices on this sheet.
Please notify the experimenters if you are done with the decision sheet.
1511 Tables and ﬁgures
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Beliefs: Fraction(Bs Cooperate if A Cooperates) 252 0.67 0.26 0 1
Paid on Commission 252 0.82 0.39 0 1
Dispatched by Free Call 249 0.06 0.24 0 1
Tenure: months at current job 252 36.48 34.94 0 162
Hours per week worked 250 27.48 14.39 1 80
Household Income (in dollars) 251 22411.35 11310.28 5600 45000
Swiss 252 0.55 0.50 0 1
Male 252 0.85 0.35 0 1
Age 252 29.60 6.47 19 52.50
Married 252 0.15 0.35 0 1
Student 252 0.34 0.47 0 1
Years of Schooling 247 13.85 20.40 9 18
TABLE 1: Participant (messenger) demographics
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(1) (1r) (2) (2r) (3) (3r)
Prob(Egoist)
Paid on Commission 0.125 0.115 0.122 0.143 0.120 0.150
(0.041)*** (0.055)** (0.068)* (0.047)*** (0.066)* (0.048)***
Tenure -0.0003 0.001 -0.0003 0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Tenure × Commission 0.0003 -0.001 0.0002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Prob(Altruist)
Paid on Commission -0.044 -0.020 0.035 0.026 -0.011 -0.014
(0.081) (0.111) (0.110) (0.164) (0.124) (0.179)
Tenure 0.0005 -0.0002 -0.001 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tenure × Commission -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.0003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Demographics Included No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 243 153 243 153 235 147
Pseudo R
2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.10
TABLE 2:  The Effect of Performance Pay on Social Preference
(Dependent variable is behavioral type)
Notes: Results are marginal effects from multinomial logit regressions using robust standard errors.  The baseline 
category is conditional cooperator. * indicates significance at the 10%. ** 5%, and *** 1% level.
17 
(1) (1r) (2) (2r) (3) (3r)
Paid on Commission -0.090 -0.200 -0.083 -0.263 -0.145 -0.324
(0.047)** (0.064)*** (0.071) (0.108)** (0.071)** (0.107)***
Tenure 0.001 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure × Commission -0.0001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Demographics Included No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 252 157 252 157 244 151
Truncated Observations 28 15 28 15 27 15
Pseudo R
2 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.14 0.13 0.40
Notes: Results are from tobit regressions.   * indicates significance at the 10%. ** 5%, and *** 1% level.
TABLE 3:  The Effect of Performance Pay on Beliefs
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Graphs by Firm Type
Figure 1: The distribution of types in the sequential prisoner’s dilemma by messenger com-
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Graphs by Firm Type
Figure 2: The distribution of beliefs about how many second-movers will cooperate if the
ﬁrst-mover does in the sequential prisoner’s dilemma by messenger compensation scheme

























































Figure 4: The distribution of beliefs about how many second-movers will cooperate if the
ﬁrst-mover does in the sequential prisoner’s dilemma by ﬁeld or lab implementation.
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